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Abstract
A smart toy is defined as a device consisting of a
physical toy component that connects to one or more
toy computing services to facilitate gameplay in the
cloud through networking and sensory technologies to
enhance the functionality of a traditional toy. A smart
toy in this context can be effectively considered an
Internet of Things (IoT) with Artificial Intelligence (AI)
which can provide Augmented Reality (AR)
experiences to users. In this paper, the first assumption
is that children do not understand the concept of
privacy and the children do not know how to protect
themselves online, especially in a social media and
cloud environment. The second assumption is that
children may disclose private information to smart toys
and not be aware of the possible consequences and
liabilities. This paper presents a privacy rule
conceptual model with the concepts of smart toy,
mobile service, device, location, and guidance with
related privacy entities: purpose, recipient, obligation,
and retention for smart toys. Further the paper also
discusses an implementation of the prototype interface
with sample scenarios for future research works.

1. Introduction
A toy is an item or product intended for learning or
play, which can have various benefits to childhood
development. The modern toy industry is comprised of
establishments primarily engaged in manufacturing
dolls, toys and games. As such a substantial part of
human development, toys have continued to maintain a
presence in the daily lives of billions of individuals of
all ages. While primitive toys included rocks and
pinecones, they soon progressed into dolls, stuffed
animals and trains. Traditionally, toys have been
entirely autonomous and without any processing or
networking capabilities to communicate with any other
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device. While a child user is engaged with a traditional
toy, it will collect and store no personal data, and
require no reason for concern for a child’s privacy.
With the introduction of electronic toys with embedded
systems, electronic toys can have sensory capabilities,
and the ability to collect and store inputted data based
on the user’s interactions. This data is limited and used
only for the interaction, often discarded immediately.
An electronic toy has limited or no networking
capability. Thus, privacy concerns are limited to
nonexistent in this context. In the past few decades,
electronic toys such as Speak & Spell, Tamagotchi,
and Furby had become popular.
A smart toy has been defined as a device consisting
of a physical toy component that connects to one or
more toy computing services to facilitate gameplay in
the cloud through networking and sensory technologies
to enhance the functionality of a traditional toy [1]. A
smart toy in this context can be effectively considered
an Internet of Things (IoT) with Artificial Intelligence
(AI) which can provide Augmented Reality (AR)
experiences to users. Examples of these are Mattel’s
Hello Barbie and Cognitoys’ Dino. Smart toys are able
to gather data on the context of the user (e.g., time of
day, location, weather, etc.) and provide personalized
services based on this context data. However, the user
may not be comfortable with the level of data that is
collected and inferred on them.
There are three general properties of a smart toy:
(1) pervasive – a smart toy may follow child through
everyday activities; (2) social – social aspects and
multiplayer are becoming a mandatory aspect of
interactive smart toys in a one-to-one, one-to-many and
many-to-many relations [2]; and (3) connected – smart
toys may connect and communicate with other toys
and services through networks. For example,
Cognitoys’ Dino can listen and answer questions raised
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by children by voice because the Dino connected to the
IBM Watson’s knowledge called Elemental Path’s
“friendgine”, which is a child-friendly database at the
backend. Some research studies found out that children
have emotional interactions with dolls and stuffed toys
in anthropomorphic design [3]. Some children even
prefer to take the toy to the dinner table or make a bed
for it next to the child’s own [4]. Many studies found
that anthropomorphic toys such as a teddy bear or
bunny serve a specific purpose, as children trusted such
designs and felt at ease disclosing private information.
As a result, Toy Computing is a recently developing
concept which transcends the traditional toy into a new
area of computer research using services computing
technologies [5]. In this context, a toy is a physical
embodiment artifact that acts as a child user interface
for toy computing services in cloud. A smart toy can
also capture child user’s physical activity state (e.g.,
voice, walking, standing, running, etc.) and store
personalized information (e.g., location, activity
pattern, etc.) through camera, microphone, Global
Positioning System (GPS), and various sensors such as
facial recognition or sound detection. In 2015, a new
invention called the “Google Toy,” which is an
internet-connected teddy bear and bunny, like an
anthropomorphic device with speech and face
recognition functions that will have the ability to
control smart home appliances and devices at home.
However, this toy has caused many criticisms from the
media as people express concern about privacy
breaching and safety issues by Google.
More specifically, the toy makers are confronted
with the challenge of better understanding the
consumer needs, concerns and exploring the possibility
of adopting such data-collected smart toys to rich
information interface in this emerging market. For
example, many toy designers have been researching
the balance between the level of private information a
toy collected from a child and the level of personalized
features the toy provided to the child. Referring to the
direction of the United States Federal Trade
Commission Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
(COPPA) and the European Union Data Protection
Directive (EUDPD), the definition of a child to be an
individual under the age of 13 years old. In this paper,
the first assumption is that children do not understand
the concept of privacy and the children do not know
how to protect themselves online, especially in a social
media and cloud environment. The second assumption
is that children may disclose private information to
smart toys and not be aware of the possible
consequences and liabilities.
Breaches of privacy can result in threats to the
physical safety of the child user [6]. While the parents
(or any legal guardians) of a child strive to ensure their

child’s physical and online safety and privacy, there is
no common approach for these parents to control the
information flow between their child and the smart
toys they interact with [7]. As smart toys are able to
collect a variety of data such as text, picture, video,
sound, location, and sensing data, this makes the
context far more complicated than many other smart
devices in particular given that the subjects are mainly
children in a physical and social environment. Parental
control is a feature in a smart toy for the parents to
restrict the content the children can provide to the toy.
Though the toy industry has also issued regulations for
toy safety, these regulations have no mention of
privacy issues in this toy computing paradigm.
This paper presents a privacy rule conceptual
model with the concepts of toy, mobile service, device,
and guidance with related privacy entities: purpose,
recipient, obligation, and retention for the toy
computing environment. In this model, the parents/
legal guardians are the owners of their child’s data
which is collected on their child (the data subject) in
according to COPPA and EUDPD. Parents provide
consent through access rules which allow their child’s
data to be shared according to their preferences and
privacy compliance. This paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 discusses related works and Section
3 presents the conceptual model with related
algorithms. Next, Section 4 discusses the model in a
prototype interface with example scenarios. Section 5
concludes the paper with future works.

2. Related Work
Recently the topic of smart toy is gaining
increasingly more public interest. For example, Yahoo
Canada published a report called “Electronic toy maker
VTech’s zero accountability clause puts onus for hacks
on parents” on February 12, 2016, which said: “the
collection of data through toys and apps geared
towards children presents a growing challenge. In
Canada we have a very restrictive and well defined
privacy act for the healthcare domain. In the toy
industry, they see all those safeguards and guidelines
and they only talk about the safety of a toy. Those
guidelines have not caught up to the information
collecting aspect.” This report shows the public
concerns on the toy safety and privacy issues in our
society. However, there is limited research on this
specific cross-disciplinary research topic in toy
computing. For example, AlHarthy and Shawkat [8]
discuss a security solution to protect the network data
from unauthorized access from controlling unmanaged
smart devices, but they do not provide a generic
privacy rule conceptual model for this paradigm. Next,
Armando et al. [9] describe a technical approach to
secure the smart device paradigm based on a given
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organization’s security policy, but without discussing
the privacy protection model from the perspective of
users. Then, Peng et al. [10] present threat detection
and mitigation mechanisms on mobile devices in a
prioritized defense deployment, but they do not cover a
privacy rule model to tackle the requirements of
accessing mobile services. Referring to the research
works in IoT, Alqassem and Svetinovic [11] describe
the challenges to tackling IoT privacy and security
requirements as follows: (1) it is difficult to determine
what information should be protected, when to protect
it, and to whom access should be granted/restricted; (2)
IoT consists of diverse technologies and the integration
of these technologies may lead to unknown risks; and
(3) the changing nature of the environment plays an
important role when dealing with the privacy and
security vulnerabilities of the IoT. Though there is a lot
of related research in security and privacy of IoT, there
is no standardized model which focuses on smart toys
in this paradigm. For example, Sun et al. [12] proposes
a personal privacy protection policy model based on
homomorphism encryption in IoT, but there is no
specific privacy rule design.
With all of this in mind, privacy is a growing
concern among many users of mobile devices. While
many users appreciate the value of targeted services in
mobile devices, they still express concern over how
their data is collected and managed without their
knowledge. For example, Cherubini et al. [13] identify
privacy as a barrier to the adoption of mobile phone
context services. 70% of consumers say it is important
to know exactly what personal information is being
collected and shared [14], while 92% of users
expressed concern about applications collecting
personal information without their consent [15].
Mobile applications have adapted countless services to
better analyze context data and provide custom
services that will bring the most value to a user based
on what they are most likely to need. While allowing
context data to be collected for services can prove to be
of great benefit to users, there is an ongoing tradeoff
between utility and privacy [16]. In summary, smart
toys which embrace sensory and networking
capabilities open up new threats to privacy [17],
stimulate new user requirements [18], and establish a
unique case for privacy rule model in toy computing.
To our best knowledge, there is still no legislation or
industry standard which specifically regulates security
and privacy requirements for smart toys.
For illustration, the conceptual model we discuss in
this paper focuses on how to protect the child’s
location information based on IETF RFC6280.
Referring to IETF RFC6280 by Barnes et al. [19],
Geopriv is an Internet Best Current Practice for
location and location privacy in internet applications,

which enables users to express preferences for the
disclosure of their location information. For example,
the user can make a rule that their location is not to be
disclosed beyond the intended recipient. This
architecture binds the privacy rules to the data so that
receiving entities are informed of when their data is
shared to other parties. Various techniques have been
used in attempt to preserve the privacy of a user’s
location. Some approaches include degrading quality,
creating fake location points, uncertainty, pseudonyms,
sharing opaque identifiers using symmetric key
encryption,
k-anonymity
through
cloaking.
Pseudonyms and k-anonymity methods have been
proven inadequate for protecting users’ location data
and preventing re-identification.
On the other hand, location-based services, also
known as location-aware mobile services, have become
widely popular to provide information such as events,
traveling, shopping and entertainment. Location-based
services have been defined by Duri et al. [20] as
“services in which the location of a person or an object
is used to shape or focus the application or service”.
Pura [21] identifies location as one of the most
promising applications of mobile commerce, due to the
ability to allow service providers to offer customized
services based on context and resulting in increased
perceived value and loyalty of customers.
The mobile application industry has observed a
widespread adoption of mobile game applications such
as Pokemon Go [33]. This has been successful due to
factors such as increased mobility and social network
integration [22]. Location-based services have also
been used in applications for games. The popular
mobile game Angry Birds [23] has a location-based
feature which allows users to compete with other based
on a leader board associated with their location. Next,
MyTown [24] is another mobile game, reminiscent of
Monopoly, where users can check in to a physical
location, buy and sell properties, and collect rent from
other players who check into the same location. Then,
Kaasinen [25] conducted a study to investigate user
needs for location-aware mobile services:
 Contents: topical up to date information,
comprehensive relevant information, interaction
(user is moving and can only provide limited
interaction to device), push information based on
both location and personalization, detailed search
options, planning vs. spontaneity.
 Personalization: personal options and contents,
user-generated content.
 Seamless service entities: consistency, seamless
solutions to support the whole user activity.
 Privacy: the right to locate, use, store, and forward
the location. Privacy requirements are based on
legislation and social regulation. The paper also
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identifies Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P)
[26] as a potential approach to manage user privacy
preferences and compare them to the locationaware service’s privacy practices. P3P is a privacy
policy framework created by the World Wide Web
Consortium (W3C), based on the eXtensible
Markup Language (XML), designed to help end
users manage their privacy while navigating
websites that have differing privacy policies. User’s
privacy preferences are expressed using A P3P
Preference Exchange Language (APPEL), which
enables websites to express their privacy practices
in a standard format that can be retrieved
automatically and interpreted easily by users of P3P
browsers. We also adopt the concepts built in P3P
into our conceptual model.

3. Privacy Rule Conceptual Model
Privacy rules can be achieved through privacy
preserving mechanisms such as access control. In order
to provide the most relevant content, the smart toy will
need to collect certain context data such as the child’s
location, and also potential profile information such as
age and gender to help determine what their interests
may be based on demographic. To gain even more
context of the child, the smart toy may collect and
retain historical data on the child such as previous
movement patterns via GPS, camera and various
sensors, to determine where the child is likely to be at
certain times, if the child is travelling, or previous
interactions with the smart toy such as which content
they had previously been interested in. It is clear that
the more information is collected on the child, the
more relevant services can be provided to the child.
However, the user may not be comfortable with the
level of data that is collected and inferred on them [27].
There are countless types of data that can be collected
from smart toys that must be considered when
evaluating the scope of privacy. This is true of
collected sensory data, and also from within other
applications, sensitive data can be collected such as a
user’s profile information, contact list, or calendar. All
of this information can be collected and analyzed to
determine context data about the children and then the
smart toy may provide personalized functions [28].
Referring to Figure 1, the children (users) may
interact with different smart toys from different toy
makers in a physical and social environment such as
Mattel’s Hello Barbie and Cognitoys’ Dino. The smart
toys may be equipped with camera, microphone, GPS,
and sensors for face and sound detection. These smart
toys may send the collected information such as text,
picture, video, sound (voice), location and sensing data
to the toy computing services, which are published and
managed by different toy computing providers and

even bind with other third party services, in the cloud.
Each smart toy should have its own privacy policy that
outlines information including how it will collect,
manage, share, and retain the user’s personal data [28].
In the privacy rule conceptual model, a subject is a
3-tuple entity comprised of a smart toy, a device, and a
mobile service. The mobile service may communicate
with external entities over a network, such as other
devices or cloud services. The user who interacts with
the subject is a child (data subject) who is associated
with an identity and a parent (data owner) who is in
control of their data. In this model, access control
decisions are based on permissions which are assigned
by the parent, comprised of a list of rules for operations
(read, write, etc.) and objects. Figure 2 illustrates a
core access control model which allows parents to
manage their privacy preferences for access to their
child’s location data, as an illustrative example. In the
toy computing environment, location data is
particularly sensitive data because it is the location of
the child using the toy. The location object is sensitive
information when associated with the user’s identity
since it allows other entities to be aware of the child’s
physical location. The motivation for this access
control model is to protect this property from being
shared with untrusted external entities. The motivation
for this access control model is to protect this property
from being shared with untrusted external entities.
Traditional access control models make access
decisions (permit/deny) based on low level operations,
such as read and write, for describing a subject’s
operation on an object. For example, user A is allowed
to read file B, in which case user A is the subject, file B
is the object, and read is the operation. Figure 3
presents an extended access control model for privacy
in a toy computing environment. This model shows the
privacy access control model extended over top of the
core access control model discussed in Figure 2. In the
privacy access control model, a request <Subject,
Operation, Object, Purposes, Recipients> as input, and
a response <Decision, Obligations, Retentions> as
output, as well as an optional acknowledgement
<Subject, Event> through a communication channel.
In the privacy rule conceptual model, a subject is a
3-tuple entity comprised of a smart toy, a device, and a
mobile service. The mobile service may communicate
with external entities over a network, such as other
devices or cloud services. The user who interacts with
the subject is a child (data subject) who is associated
with an identity and a parent (data owner) who is in
control of their data. In this model, access control
decisions are based on permissions which are assigned
by the parent, comprised of a list of rules for operations
(read, write, etc.) and objects. Figure 2 illustrates a
core access control model which allows parents to
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manage their privacy preferences for access to their
child’s location data, as an illustrative example. In the
toy computing environment, location data is
particularly sensitive data because it is the location of
the child using the toy. The location object is sensitive
information when associated with the user’s identity

since it allows other entities to be aware of the child’s
physical location. The motivation for this access
control model is to protect this property from being
shared with untrusted external entities. The motivation
for this access control model is to protect this property
from being shared with untrusted external entities.

Figure 1. Conceptual Model of Toy Computing
Traditional access control models make access
decisions (permit/deny) based on low level operations,
such as read and write, for describing a subject’s
operation on an object. For example, user A is allowed
to read file B, in which case user A is the subject, file B
is the object, and read is the operation. Figure 3
presents an extended access control model for privacy
in a toy computing environment. This model shows the
privacy access control model extended over top of the
core access control model discussed in Figure 2. In the
privacy access control model, a request <Subject,
Operation, Object, Purposes, Recipients> as input, and
a response <Decision, Obligations, Retentions> as
output, as well as an optional acknowledgement
<Subject, Event> through a communication channel.
In our extension for preserving privacy, we have
proposed four privacy-based entities: PURPOSES,
RECIPIENTS, OBLIGATIONS and RETENTIONS
based on P3P into the model [26] described as follows:
 PURPOSES: is a set of purposes in the system. A
subject must specify a set of purposes in the
corresponding access request. A purpose can be
described as different sub-purposes or combined
into a general purpose in a hierarchical structure
[29]. Figure 4 shows an illustrative hierarchical
structure to represent purposes that could be related
to toy computing. Different purposes can be
generalized as the root element “AnyPurpose”,

which is the most general purpose in the system.
“AnyPurpose” can be subclassified as “Personal
Purpose”, “MarketingPurpose”, “Administrative
Purpose”, “GamePurpose” and “ResearchPurpose”.
Each of these can further be subclassified into more
specific purposes.
 RECIPIENTS: is a set of recipients of the
collected object(s) belonging to the subjects/users
in the system. Each collected object has a
corresponding set of recipients. In the context of
toy computing and P3P, recipients can be described
as one of the following categories:
a) Individual: the subject who made the request or
an individual in the system.
b) Group: a group of users (e.g., the group of
USERS or SUBJECTS currently engaged in a
toy computing game session).
c) Third-party: an entity which does not belong to
the system, but is constrained by and
accountable to the object owner. This includes
EXTERNAL_ENTITIES in Figure 3.
d) Anyone: any subject or external entity.
 OBLIGATIONS: is a set of obligations in the
system that is necessary to be accepted after access
permission is granted. The obligations describe the
rules that a subject agrees to comply with after
gaining the access permission. Obligations are
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generally bound to legislation and agreements (e.g.,
“No disclosure to an unauthorized third party”).
 RETENTIONS: is a set of retention policies in the
system to be enforced after permission is granted.
Each object may have a corresponding retention
policy to enforce the duration for how long it may
be used or retained. It is recommended that a
child’s location data be retained only for the time
necessary for the stated purpose. Based on the
context of P3P, the retention policy can be
described as one of the following categories:
a) No-retention: the requested object is not
retained for more than a brief period of time,
after which it must be destroyed without being
logged, archived or stored by the recipients.

b) Stated-purpose: the requested object is retained
for the time required to meet the stated purpose
and will be discarded as soon as possible after
the purpose is satisfied.
c) Legal-requirement: the requested object is
retained to meet a stated purpose (as required by
law or liability under applicable law).
d) Business-practices: the requested object is
retained under the stated business practices.
e) Indefinitely: the requested object is retained for
an indeterminate period of time.

Figure 2. Core Access Control Model

Figure 3. Extended Privacy Access Control Model

Figure 4. Illustrative Purpose Hierarchy Structure

While we are concerned with location data, some
relevant categories are shown in Figure 5 as follows:
a) AnyLocationObjectType:
is
a
general
description of any location object type.
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b) Absolute Location: is the location expressed in
a range or exact GPS coordinates, latitude and
longitude. The absolute location can be
expressed as coarse (GPS-based, approximate
location) or fine (network-based, precise
location) [30].
c) Relative Location: is the location relative to
another entity as a reference point. Relative
location can be expressed as the distance
between user A and user B, user A and device C,
or user A and location D.
d) Categotical Location: is the location expressed
in a predefined category. Some examples
include home, office, street, mall, or restaurant.

Figure 5. Location Object Types
Referring to Figure 3, a subject has access to an
object, only if the access is authorized by the core
access control. Also, the subject needs to specify the
purposes of the access and the recipients of the result
of the access operation. The purposes and the
recipients must be legitimated according to the access
of the object defined by the owner or an authority such
as the government. Thus, obligations and a retention
policy will be returned as a response message if the
access is allowed. The subject must also comply with
the obligations and the retention policies. The access
request will be denied otherwise.
Parents can create policy rules for their child’s data
through the process illustrated in Figure 6. This process
is done through a mobile Web interface on the mobile
device. The policy rule creation process starts with the
initialization phase, whose first step is for the parent to
configure themselves as the child (user)’s parent. By
mapping a parent to a child user, the parent becomes
the owner of the child’s data. Next, the parent consents
to the End User License Agreement (EULA) on behalf
of the child, agreeing to the terms of the mobile
service. Lastly, the parent sets their communication
channel (e.g., email address) and preferences for
receiving acknowledgements of privacy updates related
to their child’s data. As the second step, the parent can
create policy rules according to their preferences for
how their child’s data can be collected and shared. This
model uses positive authorization, in which parents
define the rules for what is allowed. To create a policy

rule, the parent first specifies the subject (their child),
the object (e.g., absolute location data), the allowed
operation (e.g., read), the allowed purposes (e.g., game
purpose), and the allowed recipients (e.g., other users
in-game). Next, the parent specifies the obligations and
retention policies that the recipient must comply to in
order to receive the data object with an expiry date.
After a rule is created, this second step can be repeated
to create as many rules as desired. Step 3 shows the
administrative tasks to manage the privacy rules.

Figure 6. Privacy Rule Creation Process

Figure 7. Access Control Decision Process
The access control decision procedure in the privacy
access control model is described in Figure 7. A
subject first requests access to a user’s location
information, specifying the subject, object, operation,
purposes, and recipients. After receiving the request, as
the second step, the privacy access control model
processes the request as follows: (1) checks the owner
of the requested object; (2) retrieves the corresponding
privacy rules from the system; and, then, (3) checks the
acknowledgment communication channel for the
subject owner. Next, as the third step, the decision is
made by: (1) checking the permissions from the core
access control model; (2) checking the allowed
purposes; and, then, (3) checking allowed recipients.
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As the fourth step, the final decision is made and the
system returns a response and acknowledgement. The
response can be either permit, along with the
obligations and retention policy or deny. If applicable,
the acknowledgement is sent to the subject owner
through the predefined acknowledgement channel, and
contains the subject and event. Lastly, the model
records all of the above in the audit logs.

Figure 8. Example Scenario 1: Sphero

4. Discussion
Referring to a toy computing scenario, in this
section we present some example scenarios using Tek
Recon, and Sphero to illustrate some possible privacy
access control rules based on the model.
Scenario 1: Sphero [31] is another recent toy
computing product in the industry, first introduced in
2011 by Orbotix, which then released subsequent
versions, Sphero 2.0 in 2013 and Sphero Ollie in 2014.
Referring to Figure 8, Sphero is a robotic ball which
can be controlled and programmed through the user’s
smartphone or tablet. There are over 30 apps available
for Sphero, most of which are games, while others are
focused on education. This product is marketed not
only to children and can be appropriate for any age
group. While the physical ball component is a very
simple and traditional concept, the capabilities of the
toy increase substantially with the inclusion of robotics
and a mobile device. The Sphero ball has wireless
networking capabilities, an accelerometer and
gyroscope, rolls in every direction, and glows different
and a mobile device. The Sphero ball has wireless
networking capabilities, an accelerometer and
gyroscope, rolls in every direction, and glows different
colors. Sphero can be programmed by the user through
an app called Sphero Macrolab, which includes a set of
predefined macros, and more advanced users can use
another app called orbBasic to program in a language
based on BASIC. A parent may access their child’s
location records collected by Sphero. They may update
their
contact
information
for
receiving
acknowledgements. Some examples of privacy rules
for this scenario are presented as follows.
Privacy rules:
S1.1: A parent/guardian (data owner) is allowed to
read or copy his child’s location record

(Parent/Guardian, read, locationRecord, _, _, permit, _, _)
(Parent/Guardian, copy, locationRecord, _, _, permit, _, _)

S1.2: A parent/guardian is allowed to update
his/her contact information
(owner, update, ContactInformation, _, _, permit, _, _)

Scenario 2: Tek Recon [32]: is a line of toy blasters
developed by Tech4Kids, marketed to children aged 8
years and up in 2013. While this product features a
physical component identical in concept to a traditional
toy blaster, the novelty is the ability to integrate with a
mobile device. Referring to Figure 9, the Tek Recon
blaster features a mount on top where a smartphone is
inserted. A mobile application has been developed by
Tech4Kids which operates in collaboration with the
physical blaster to augment traditional blaster-based
games. The application provides several functionalities
including a scope, which uses the smartphone camera
to display what is in front of the user with additional
features overlaid on top, such as ammunition, score,
radio, and a GPS location map of other players. The
application has networking functionality to create and
join games with friends over a LAN or mobile
network. The user is also required to create an account
online, where the scores and account information are
stored. As shown in Figure 9, a child using Tek Recon
has been connected to a mobile service using location
services in a toy computing environment to share his
location to their friends and see their locations in
return. Once the service receives the user’s location
record, the service may read and disclose the location
information to other players for the purpose of the
game, and delete the records immediately after the
game is complete. An example of privacy rule for this
scenario 2 is presented as follows.

Figure 9. Example Scenario 2: Tek Recon
Privacy rule:
S2.1. A service is allowed to read the absolute
location record of a user for the purpose of a game if
and only if the service follows obligations of disclosure
to group “game” and not to keep the record after stated
game purpose has ended.
(MobileService, read, Absolute_Location, GamePurpose,
Group:Game, permit, _, StatedPurpose)
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Referring to Figure 10, we present a demo of an
interface for parents to use in an initial setup to
configure preferences and create policy rules. These
options would appear during initial setup of a toy
computing application. These privacy settings allow
parents to create access control rules based on their
preferences on concepts from P3P, i.e. purposes,
recipients, obligations, and retentions. The first step in
the configuration process is the Profile Setup phase.
The Profile Setup phase includes three sections, the
Parent Contact Details, Child Information, and Privacy
Policy Review. The parent enters their basic
information including name and email address, and
then selects if they wish to receive email updates on
their child’s privacy-related information. Next, on the
Child Information page, the child’s first name is
entered for management purposes, and the parent then
agrees to take ownership over their child’s data. Next,
the privacy policy of the toy application is presented to
the parent to review. The parent reviews the policy and
must confirm that they have read and agree to the
terms before proceeding. By agreeing to the terms, the
parent is providing consent on their child’s behalf.

and Recipients are also presented. The parent chooses
from a list of purposes they wish to accept, as well as a
list of types of recipients. The types of recipients can
be expanded to be more specific, such as Third-Party:
Marketing, or Group: Game Players.
The next steps are the Obligations and Retention
settings, and then finally reviewing and adding the
rule, as shown in Figure 10, the parent first selects the
obligations that the service must comply with upon
receiving the child’s data. Obligations can include
compliance with PIPEDA or COPPA. The parent can
also search from a list of other obligations, or input a
custom obligation policy. For retention, the parent can
select how long they wish to allow their child’s data to
be retained. Finally, on the Review & Add Rule page,
the privacy rule is presented in plain English. Once the
parent reviews the rule, they can select “Confirm and
Add Rule” at the bottom of the screen. Once a privacy
rule is added, the parent is directed to the Manage
Privacy Rules page, which shows a table of all of the
configured privacy rules and their status (e.g., enabled,
disabled, or expired). This provides options to enable,
disable, edit, delete, or create new rules. A parent can
also return to this screen at a later time to manage rules
or renew expired rules. Once the parent is satisfied
with the privacy rules, he/she can select “Next” to be
directed to the final Review & Finish page. This page
summarizes all of the settings and confirms that the
parent has completed all of the sections. A list of
enabled privacy rules and their corresponding expiry
dates is also presented. Finally, the parent can select
“Save and Finish” to save their settings and finish the
setup. Then the settings will take effect immediately.

5. Conclusions
Figure 10. Prototype Interface Demonstration
The next phase is the Privacy Rule creation phase,
when the parent is able to create one or more privacy
rules for how their child’s private location data is used.
By default, there is no policy rules yet configured. A
new rule can be created or a template can be used.
Templates of useful policy rules can be provided to
simplify the rule configuration process for parents. The
first step of creating a new privacy rule is the General
Settings. In the General Settings, the parent can name
the rule, provide a description, and set an expiry date
for how long the rule will be in effect. Next, in the
Core Access Control settings, the mobile service
(subject), location resource (object), and operation are
selected. The objects selected are the absolute location
and relative location. Next, the settings for Purposes

This paper presented a privacy rule conceptual
model for smart toys which is one of the first attempts
in this emerging research topic. The model allows
parents to create privacy rules and receive
acknowledgements regarding their child’s privacy
sensitive location data. Next, we presented the
algorithm for access control decisions for privacy
enforcement, and finally we illustrated the applicability
of the privacy rules in a practical environment using
example scenarios with popular toy computing toys in
the industry. We are currently conducting an empirical
study to justify the user acceptability of the prototype
interface for the privacy rule conceptual model.
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